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What role for public goods in the future of CAP? 
 
 




The European Union’s Common Agricultural Policy continues to evolve. The public debate 
about its future post 2013 was launched in April 2010 and a formal Commission 
Communication on the future of the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) was published in 
November 2010 (European Commission, 2010). The Commission’s detailed legislative 
proposals are now expected in October 2011. We focus here on one of the most important 
parts of the debate – public goods and the ‘greening of the CAP’.  A major rationale for the 
large sums spent under the CAP each year appears now to be centred on the provision of 
public goods. We review the Commission’s proposals for the provision of public goods and 
raise questions about the apparent justification for the general approach. We question whether 
this logic properly appreciates the nature of public good problems and whether the apparently 
obvious solution – provision of compensatory payments from the public purse – actually 




The European Union’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is currently under debate about 
the challenges it faces as well how to prepare it for the next multi-annual financial period. The 
European Commission has, as both expected and required, played a key role in framing the 
debate. It first launched a public debate in April 2010, inviting all possible stakeholders to 
join the discussion and share their views on the objectives and principles of the future policy. 
Lessons learned from the debate were summarised at a conference on the CAP post-2013, 
held in July 2010 in Brussels, which brought together the numerous contributions expressed 
during the public debate. The conference was also an important step in the Commission's 
preparations for its official Communication (EC, 2010) on the future of the CAP, which was 
presented on 18 November 2010. The purpose of the Communication was to suggest changes 
and to set priorities for the CAP after 2013 on the basis of the public debate and the various 
options and opinions expressed since the Health Check, the last stage of the CAP reform 
process. The Communication can be interpreted as a move to reorient the CAP towards a 
policy to meet the economic, environmental and social challenges that European agriculture 
and rural development face. Others, perhaps, might suggest that rather than re-orienting, the 
sun should be allowed to set on the policy (as in occident). Having arisen largely as a result of 
historical accident (being best fitted to its previous socio-economic and political conditions), 
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has now become too fossilised and encumbered with its ancestral baggage to be capable of 
further sensible or sustainable evolution or reformation. In any event, the Commission had 
planned to publish its legislative proposals in July 2011, but this has now been effectively 
delayed until mid October.
1 
 
This paper addresses one of the most important issues in the debate: public goods. Policy 
makers and stakeholders, in searching for a new and more legitimate rationale for the large 
annual sums spent on the CAP, have already focused on the provision of public goods as 
being such a rationale. There is a growing socio-political consensus on the need for public 
support for farming’s green contributions and activities. But the logical or economic 
justification is less clear. We examine the alternative justifications, which have received 
limited criticism so far in the policy literature. Our paper is structured as follows. First, the 
public goods concept is outlined for the cases of public goods provided by agriculture. 
Second, policy tools to encourage the provision of public goods are reviewed, followed by the 
overview of current public goods support in the CAP. Part III reflects on the contents of the 
Communication, especially focusing on direct payments and public goods. These reflections 
provide the basis for identifying the major problems behind the “public goods provision 
concept”, followed by some policy recommendations for the future. Part IV concludes. 
 
The public goods concept 
 
The theory of public goods is well-developed in the welfare economics and public policy 
literature, where the concept is characterised by non-excludability and non-rivalry. Non-
excludability means that if the good is available to one person, others cannot be excluded 
from its benefits, while non-rivalry refers to the fact that a good consumed by one person does 
not reduce the availability to others. In other words, excludability determines whether or not 
access to ecosystem services can be rationed (and thus priced by a provider), while rivalry 
determines whether or not it should be (Farley-Constanza, 2010). A common example for 
public goods is street lighting or air as people cannot be excluded from breathing the air and 
one person’s enjoyment does not reduce the enjoyment of others. The dimensions of non-
excludability and non-rivalry define a simple matrix where public goods can be easily located 
(Table 1). 
 
Table 1: Types of goods with examples 
Dimension Excludable  Non-excludable 
Rival  Private goods  
(food, clothing) 
Common goods  
(grazing, fish) 
Non-rival  Club goods  
(cinemas, private parks) 
Public goods  
(air, national defense) 
 
                                                 
1   As reported in Agra Europe, March 11, 2011, „ Commissioner “Ciolos has pledged to carry out an impact 
assessment (IA) to test the effects of various CAP redistribution scenarios before working these into 
concrete proposals; the budget plans will lay out the total figure available per annum for the CAP, and DG 
Agri will seek to produce an IA which divvies up the money which is actually on the table. These time 
demands, coupled with the obligatory six-week period of inter-service consultation - during which other 
Commission departments scrutinise the plans - make mid-October the earliest realistic date for releasing the 
proposals, sources said.” 
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The opposite of a public good is a private good, totally excludable and rival. A cup of coffee, 
for example, is a private good as its owner can exclude others from using it, and once it has 
been consumed, it cannot be used again. A good which is rival but non-excludable is termed 
common, such as deep sea fishing. This case is mainly visualised by the well-known example 
of the tragedy of the commons (although by no means all commons end in tragedy). The 
fourth element of the matrix consists of club goods, characterised as non-rival but excludable. 
These goods have various forms like cinemas or private parks, where those having enough 
money can enjoy the benefits of the provision without rivalry, subject to the capacity of the 
provision.  
 
Under the free market system, private goods are supplied through market interactions, 
provided that there is an efficient functioning of the market mechanisms. However, these 
mechanisms do not function well in the case of public goods since consumers and users 
cannot be excluded from the benefits of the good but do not have full (selfish) incentives to 
pay for it. This usually leads to “free-rider” behaviour where everyone expects the public 
good to be supplied but no one wants to pay for it. However, providers (farmers or land 
managers) do not have an incentive to supply them without reward – a classical situation 
leading to undersupply. It follows that public goods have no observed prices and are difficult 
to measure in economic terms. While much of the current economic effort on the issue is 
devoted to establishing reliable estimates of the public’s willingness to pay for public goods 
(e.g. Kumar, 2010)
2, others (e.g. Norgaard, 2010) question this approach, suggesting in 
essence that the farce of the bazaar may supplant the tragedy of the commons. 
 
For specific public goods (e.g. climate stability, air quality, etc.), more complex mechanisms 
are needed to coordinate supply and demand. A critical issue here is the articulation of 
collective demand, which is often expressed in political targets to stipulate the level of 
provision required. There exist a number of policy tools to enhance the provision of public 
goods (see below).    
 
Public goods provided by agriculture  
 
Agriculture and the environment are inextricably linked as through farming practices. 
Agriculture has always played a major role in shaping the environment, while external 
environmental conditions also have their impacts on agriculture. Public goods provided 
through European agriculture can take the form of capacities or capitals (e.g. cultural 
landscapes) or services (e.g. resilience to flooding or fire). Public goods can also be classified 
as environmental (biodiversity, air quality, etc.) or social (rural vitality, food security). As to 
environmental public goods, there is significant variation in the scale at which they are 
provided across different farming systems.    
 
Agriculture currently accounts for approximately a half of the territory of the EU-27 Member 
States. As a productive activity, it has always had a considerable impact on the natural 
environment. However, the technologies of the last two centuries, especially those developed 
in the last fifty years, resulted in the growth of harmful agricultural impacts on the 
environment. Searching for efficiency gains and increasing intensification have not been 
 
2   Kumar, 2010 is the first of a series of outputs from The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity (TEEB) 
programme, hosted by UNEP, with the initial aim of valuing global natural capital. 85th Annual Conference of the Agricultural Economics Society 
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without environmental and social costs. There is widespread evidence of adverse 
environmental impacts, resulting in, inter alia, loss of habitats, declines in species, air and 
water pollution and extensive soil degradation. Low intensity farming systems, in particular, 
are supposed to provide a suite of public goods, by maintaining and enhancing biodiversity 
and landscape and by having good soil and water management practices. In addition to these 
environmental public goods, agriculture has played an important role in Europe in shaping the 
cultural heritage and sustaining social capital in rural areas (Cooper et al, 2009). A wide range 
of economic activities such as rural tourism and recreation also said to depend on the 
existence and continued provision of public goods.  
 
Multifunctionality of agriculture entered the policy agenda lexicon almost a decade ago, 
stressing the various roles of agriculture playing in rural areas. A common definition of 
multifunctionality used by economists is the joint production of commodities and public 
goods, implying that the term encompasses elements that range from private good provision 
to goods with public good attributes. Although ‘multifunctionality’ now seems to have 
disappeared from the CAP rhetoric, it is clear that the idea of certain forms and patterns of 
farming being worth preserving for their social, cultural and environmental benefits continues 
to be an important part of the CAP debate. The multifunctional role of agriculture provides 
several public goods as by-products to its market commodities (e.g. Romstad, 2002). 
Landscape management, biodiversity, wildlife habitat preservation and water-land-air 
management are all common examples of ‘goods’ provided (mostly as a by-product) by 
agriculture. However, the lack of a market to provide these public goods creates a need for 
public policy to intervene and an associated spending programme in order to support the 
farming systems which deliver these goods (Romstad, 2002). The delivery of public goods is 
still being used as a justification for the direct payments: “At the same time, the provision of a 
basic income payment to all farmers ensures the basic provision of public goods throughout 
Europe, by encouraging them to stay in farming” (EC, 2009, p.11).  
 
Certain forms of agricultural production provide a wide range of public goods for the society. 
The most significant public goods associated with EU agriculture do not all share the same 
characteristics, though they are all linked to certain types of agricultural activities. Cooper et 
al. (2009), in a recent report to the European Commission, define and classify the most 
relevant public goods provided by EU agriculture as follows: agricultural landscapes; 
farmland biodiversity; water quality and availability; soil functionality; climate stability; air 
quality; resilience to flooding; resilience to fire; rural vitality; food security; animal welfare. 
 
It is clear that these diverse public goods have different characteristics and also cater for 
different needs of European society. Some of them meet environmental needs, while others 
respond to social necessities. It is also evident that public goods associated with agriculture do 
not all share the same underlying relationship with agricultural production. On the one hand, 
the existence of certain public goods – such as landscapes or farmland biodiversity - is 
inherently linked to agricultural activity and possibilities to provide them through alternative 
land use practices are limited. On the other hand, in case of rural vitality or air quality, the 
provision is not necesarily dependent on agricultural activity and can also be provided by 
alternative forms of land use. Preparing for the future requires that the complexity of the 
system is recognised by agricultural policy, applying differentiated and targeted policies 
rather than seeking a one-size-fits-all solution. 
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It is widely argued that provision of public goods provides a justifcation for public 
intervention in Europe (Cooper et al., 2009). This argument is usually underpinned by the 
special characteristics of agriculture such as the high level of interaction with the environment 
or its large share of the European land area and the fact that there is a shortfall in the provision 
of environmental public goods in Europe. The reason for this under-provision is that public 
goods are not supplied adequately through the market and without a so called “proper 
allocation mechanism”, public goods will remain at a lower level than desired by the society. 
 
Policy tools for the provision of public goods 
 
Various agricultural policy tools exist to encourage landowners to internalise the benefits 
provided by the natural capital on their property, encouraging them to provide public goods. 
These tools are well classified by Kemkes et al. (2010) into 5Ps – prescription, penalty, 
property rights, payments and public information (persuasion). Table 2 (ibid) defines the 
policy tools and their associated dimensions available for ecosystem service provision on 
private property. Whether a given policy tool is efficient, equitable, and effective depends on 
public goals as priorities may change over time and differ across regions. Prescriptive policies 
for the provision of ecosystem services on private property, such as various regulations on 
land use and management, are necessarily highly coercive, and are often considered 
politically infeasible or costly to implement. However, these policies can be highly effective 
when enforced and justified when marginal damage to an ecosystem is high.  
 
 
Table 2: Policy tools to encourage the provision of public goods and degree of each 
dimension 
Policy tool 
/dimension  Coerciveness Visibility Automaticity  Directness 
Prescription      
Regulation High  Low  Low  Medium 
Penalty      
Taxes Medium  Medium  High  Medium 
Property rights      
Land use moratorium  High  Low  Low  High 
Tradeable  permits  Medium Medium Medium Medium 
Payments      
Tax Low  Medium  High  Medium 
Expenditures Medium  High High Low 
Grants  Low Medium Low Medium 
Easements  Low High Low High 
Direct  payments NA. NA. NA. NA. 
Public information  Low  Medium  Low  Low to High 
Source: Kemkes et al., 2010 
 
 
Penalties, such as taxes, charges, etc. are highly automatic and efficient in encouraging land 
management practices providing public goods. Such policies are not equitable, though, as 
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rights, such as land use moratorium and tradable permits, are highly coercive and efficient in 
high priority cases, though these tools are less visible and automatic. Payments for 
disseminating public information in an effort to change landowner behaviour have low levels 
of coerciveness, though may capture a high level of political support and can directly target 
potential providers. However, this might not be enough to induce changes in behaviour.  
 
Payments for ecosystem services (PES) have been defined as voluntary transactions where an 
ecosystem service is bought by at least one buyer from at least one provider, if and only if a 
provider secures the provision of the service (Wunder, 2005). If an option (e.g. grants, 
easements, direct payments, etc.) is present, landowners can voluntarily supply ecosystem 
services and be compensated for this activity. These payments are effective when transaction 
and implementation costs are low and benefits can be captured by the ‘buyers’ (Kemkes et al., 
2010).  
 
However, there is no reason to intervene to secure the provision of all public goods in Europe. 
This would be prohibitively costly and public finance is limited. Public intervention is only 
needed in those cases when public demand is greater than the level of provision. In other 
words, public intervention is only needed when the supply of public goods is inadequate or 
expected to decline. This point raises a number of questions. First, it is a difficult, and thus 
contentious exercise to measure overall demand for European public goods, especially given 
the diversity of the public goods outlined above. Second, it is seldom clear how any demand 
in excess of current provision can be linked to quantifiable targets. Which indicators should 
be chosen so as to best reflect the overall status of the provision of European public goods? 
Third, many of these indicators only provide information at a pan-European scale and trends 
at the European level may mask considerable differences between and within Member States. 
Fourth, given the multifaceted nature of certain of these public goods, indicators relating to a 
single parameter are often an inadequate measure of the composite whole. Fifth, for many 
indicators, data have not been collected over time, meaning that we do not have a full picture 
of the current level of provision. What we have instead are just “snap-shots”, making it nearly 
impossible to assess whether the environmental state is improving or declining.      
 
Nevertheless, most commentators appear to agree that environmental payments are justified 
by the public good market failure, and continue the logic to recommend closely targeted 
payments made to those actually providing the goods (and services). However, Harvey (2003) 
questions whether there are strong grounds to believe that government, especially central EU 
government, is necessarily better than the market at solving the failure. He points out that the 
market failure results from the fact that the necessary transactions between the providers of 
the widely heterogeneous public goods and those willing to pay for their provision are 
prohibitively costly. As Coase (1960) pointed out, if transactions costs are low, public goods 
are not a problem. In this sense, the market does not fail, it simply records the fact that the 
effort to solve the problem is not worthwhile – the benefits of solution do not outweigh the 
costs of doing so. Of course, even when (as is increasingly the case) the market does consider 
it worthwhile, there is the ‘free rider’ problem – those who are willing to pay in principle 
choose not to on the grounds that the public goods and services will be provided by others and 
there is no need for their own individual contribution. Harvey (ibid.) argues that the free-rider 
problem does justify some public (government) contribution towards the provision of public 
goods by land users. However, he also argues that the problems of aligning willingness to pay 
for them with the costs of provision cannot be solved effectively (still less, efficiently) by 85th Annual Conference of the Agricultural Economics Society 
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bureaucracies. There is no necessary correspondence between the need for government 
support and the requirement for government provision. He argues that we need to encourage 
quasi-market solutions to the problem, rather than yet more public programmes. 
 
Moreover, we should be aware that agricultural policies creating artificial markets (demand) 
for public goods have two important drawbacks: (1) direct interaction between supply and 
demand is still absent with all its problems and (2) there is no possibility to check the quality 
of public goods, compared to an open market system. These characteristics run the risk of 
creating artificial but inefficient markets for the provision of public goods that could be 




Public support for public goods in Europe: A brief history 
 
The CAP has addressed the undersupply of public goods both directly and indirectly through 
a range of policy measures, though to a different extent. Current policy instruments for the 
provision of public goods can be classified into three broad groups, according to Cooper et al 
(2009): (1) measures where the provision of public goods is the primary rationale, (2) 
measures containing reference to improving the sustainability of agriculture or enhancing 
natural capital and (3) measures where the environment is much more indirect in nature 
(Table 3).  
 
Table 3: CAP measures supporting the provision of public goods 
Measures with a direct 
focus on the provision 
of public goods 
(Category 1) 
Measures with a partial 
focus on the provision 
of public goods 
(Category 2) 
Measures with a no 
direct focus on the 
provision of public 
goods (Category 3) 
Agri-environmental 
measures 






Article 68 measures 
LIFE+ 
Structural Funds 




NATURA 2000, etc.)  Direct payments 
Source: Own composition based on Cooper et al., 2009  
 
As to the first group of measures, these usually subsidise environmentally beneficial land 
management practices. The most common are agri-environmental (AE) measures, directly 
focusing on the maintenance and improvement of agricultural landscapes and biodiversity and 
thereby assisting in the provision of public goods. The role of agri-environmental measures, in 
operation since 1992, has significantly increased during the various CAP reforms and has 
given a major focus of rural development in many countries with the key priorities of 
protection of cultural landscapes and biodiversity.   
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Besides agri-environmental measures, cross-compliance and GAEC standards also play a role 
in keeping agricultural lands in good environmental shape. As these standards are compulsory 
in order to receive the full amount of decoupled direct payments, they have high coercive 
power and impact on the majority of agricultural producers, at least potentially, given the 
extent of monitoring and policing of the standards. Article 68 payments seek to target specific 
types of environmentally important farming, though to a limited extent. It serves as a tool to 
redirect first pillar instruments for environmental purposes. Besides these agriculture-related 
programmes, LIFE+ and Structural Funds might also have direct impacts on the provision of 
public goods through co-financing projects aiming to improve natural conditions, biodiversity 
as well as environment policy and governance in different regions across Europe.  
 
As for the second group, a range of rural development measures seek to support actions that 
bring about environmental improvements. Although environment is not a central objective for 
these measures, they seek to improve environmental sustainability of farms. Such measures 
include, inter alia, payments for training and advice, LFA and Natura 2000 areas, training and 
information and the conservation and upgrading of the rural heritage (Cooper et al., 2009). 
Payments for natural handicap and NATURA 2000 areas are probably one of the best 
designated and managed programmes under the second axis aiming to increase biodiversity 
and restore natural habitats in a wide range of agricultural areas throughout Europe.    
 
Measures pertaining to the third group, such as direct payments or farm diversification, do not 
have any environmental objectives but they might have impacts on the provision of public 
goods through Europe by maintaining economic viability and thereby enabling farmers to 
continue to provide public goods. With its 75-80% share of agricultural budget each year, 
decoupled direct payments, designed to support and stabilise farm incomes, seek to keep 
farming activity in place, providing a precondition for the provision of public goods. Though 
these payments have a huge geographical coverage, they are not specifically targeted (at least 
until now) at those farms that are the most environmentally vulnerable. Besides direct 
payments, specific rural development measures, including support for value added activities 
and diversification of farming also have the potential to provide indirect support for the 
provision of public goods.     
 
On the whole, it is apparent that few measures (with the exception of AE schemes) within the 
current CAP framework have a direct focus on encouraging the provision of public goods in 
Europe. Agri-environmental measures seem to play the most significant role in this regard by 
delivering substantial benefits for the environment. It is also apparent that second pillar 
measures are given the primary focus, while first pillar measures have limited impacts in the 
provision of public goods. However, existing measures seem not to have achieved the 
improvement in the provision of public goods on the scale that is required, as well discussed 
by Cooper et al (2009). Therefore, there is a clear need to change current policies and next 
section focuses on the way the Commission plans to do so.    
 
Public goods and the CAP post 2013 
 
The term public goods first entered into the CAP debate in 2007 when it was used in an 
agricultural context by the environmental NGOs (IEEP, 2010). Since then it has gradually 
infiltrated the mainstream policy debate appearing in many papers and speeches from research 
papers to the highest level of decision making. The need for securing mainly environmental 85th Annual Conference of the Agricultural Economics Society 
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public goods in the future CAP is echoed by an increasing number of stakeholders, rallying 
behind the slogan of “Public Money for Public Goods”, developed by Zahrnt (2009). 
Becomming the primary focus, the concept is now used more generally to refer to any sort of 
public benefit from agriculture, thereby justifying the need for public support, as expressed by 
various stakeholders. There is a clear danger of misusing the term as a justification for 
supporting anything that is in the “public interest” (IEEP, 2010).  
 
The latest proposals of the Commission on the future of public goods are in its official 
Communication on the future CAP (EC, 2010). Here, the Commission is keen to link the 
provision of public goods to an existing policy instrument – direct payments. By using the 
slogan of “greening the first pillar”, adjustments to the current configuration of direct 
payments are envisaged, which would represent a very important innovation in the history of 
the CAP. It appears that the present system of direct payments would be separated into a flat 
rate basic payment, available to all farmers, and a number of additional payments (a green 
component, a “natural constraints” component and limited voluntary coupled support), not 
available to everyone. The basic payment component would be subject to a ceiling per farm 
and to cross compliance, while the mandatory greening component would apparently be 
delivered through the implementation of simple, year-by-year, agri-environment actions. With 
a clear and positive message that redistribution, redesign and better targeting of support is 
needed, the new system would limit the gains and losses of Member States by guaranteeing an 
average level of direct payments to all farmers, implying that a significant redistribution of the 
level of support is needed both between farms as well as between Member States. However, 
the Communication lacks many details on design and implementation and thereby it remains 
unclear whether proposals represent a major change in the first pillar or only a very light 
greening (Jambor, 2011).  
 
Latest reports of the discussions surrounding the re-definition of the basis of direct payments, 
and their consequent redistribution between both member states and farms, strongly suggest 




Critiques of proposals associated with direct payments  
 
The combined model of direct payments (flat rate + specific components) only partially 
addresses the principal problems of the present system. On the one hand, the unequal 
distribution of these payments amongst countries and farms of various sizes appears to be 
solved by “limiting the gains and losses of Member States” and introducing an “upper 
ceiling” of payments. On the other hand, it seems that the Communication fails to address the 
fundamental problem behind direct payments: their ineffectiveness in the long run due to their 
support for the agricultural industry (processor, input supplier, landowner, etc.) instead of the 
farmer. As is well recognised in the academic debate (Jambor-Harvey, 2010), the current 
system of direct payments supports the whole agricultural sector (and not individual farmers), 
 
3   AE 2450, 11.2.2011. says: „DG Agri is currently putting together an impact assessment which will map out 
the potential effects of modifying national P1 envelopes on the basis of various 'objective' criteria – thought 
to include surface area, production conditions, employment and purchasing power. .. A diplomat from one 
EU15 state told Agra Europe that the idea of seeking 'objective criteria' may be a dead end; internal 
calculations in this member state on the basis of various potential criteria have yielded unsatisfactory 
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as revenue increases are capitalised in the value of farm assets or spent on increased 




There have been no reactions to this problem within any of the Communication proposals. 
Moreover, it is also questionable as to how redefined direct payments would provide food 
security (a social public good). As the current system of decoupled direct support suggests, a 
farmer need not even produce to receive a fixed income. If a farmer does not produce 
agricultural commodities, it is hard to imagine how he or she contributes towards ensuring 
food security. Consequently, stabilising farmers’ incomes does not necessarily mean 
guaranteeing food security, despite the fact that food security still remains the Commission’s 
major reason for maintaining farm income support. By seeking to stabilise all farmers’ 
incomes, current direct payments seem to focus on social issues (pertaining to the second 
pillar) instead of focusing on enhancing the competitiveness of farmers.  
 
Direct payments lack several important elements (Jambor, 2011). First, the share of each 
component within direct payments is not defined, nor is it clear whether there will be any 
binding requirements making farmers ineligible for the basic component if requirements for 
the other components are not met. Second, regarding the proposal of “limiting the gains and 
losses of Member States”, it is not clear how these limitations are to be made and on what 
basis national allocations are to be defined. It seems that the future system of direct payments 
will allow greater flexibility for Member States in distributing these payments, the details of 
which (especially the objective criteria determining the reallocation procedure and the exact 
degree of flexibility in implementation) are left unclear. Third, the Communication clearly 
states that the beneficiaries of direct payments should be “active farmers”, the definition of 
which is questionable. Furthermore, no performance indicator is attached to “active farmers”, 
meaning that all farmers living from agriculture have the right to receive income support. This 
logic will leave those “embedded” in agriculture in the same position in the next programme 
period, without their production performance being questioned (either for commodity or non-
commodity production). Fourth, the proposed new structure for direct payments contains 
components of the current second pillar (e.g. a greening component, areas with natural 
constraints), though it remains unclear whether this will result in any reallocation of resources 
from the second to the first pillar (an issue that emerges in many contexts throughout the 
Communication). Fifth, proposals regarding the “natural constraints” component are also 
problematic. It is not clear how this category would be defined nor is the exact 
implementation mechanism obvious (e.g. flat rate or more targeted payments). It also remains 
unclear how this new category would go together with Less Favoured Area (LFA) payments 
or support for High Nature Value (HNV) areas. 
 
Critiques of proposals associated with the provision of public goods  
 
A rich economic literature underlines the fact that securing the provision of public goods 
provides a valid reason for public intervention in a market economy. Although the 
Communication also uses this argument when elaborating its proposals on the provision of 
public goods in the CAP, these proposals have many deficiencies. First, the Communication 
 
4   These points are also made forcefully by Gardner (AE2453, 4.3.2011), referring especially to a prestantion 
made to the European Parliament by Tangermann (7.2.11). 85th Annual Conference of the Agricultural Economics Society 
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seems to focus exclusively on environmental public goods, though, as well-stated by the 
European Parliament (EP, 2010), non-environmental public goods (e.g. rural vitality, farm 
and animal welfare, food security) also exist. However, no reference is made in the text to 
public goods related to social externalities and the Communication does not make proposals 
on non-environmental public goods. 
 
Second, although the Commission calls for the “enhanced provision of environmental public 
goods” via the “greening component” of direct payments, the way of accomplishing this 
remains substantially unclear. The design of a simple, contractual, annual payments scheme, 
together with its monitoring support and penalty regimes, is unlikely to be straightforward. Of 
those mentioned, permanent pasture, green cover, crop rotation and ecological set-aside might 
have the potential to deliver a range of additional environmental benefits and all can have 
their role in the delivery of environmental public goods.  
 
Third, the provision of public goods seems to require significant institutional and 
administrative support for the management of these programmes. It is doubtful that these 
programmes can be well-administered without a substantial increase in bureaucracy. 
However, such an increase would result in cost increases and work against the “cutting the red 
tape” principle, as both argued for in the Communication and by a recent Dutch/Danish 
position paper on reducing bureaucracy.
5  
 
Apart from this, the greening component of direct payments is proposed as “a compulsory 
additional aid for specific "greening" public goods through simple, generalized, annual and 
non-contractual agri-environmental actions based on the supplementary costs for carrying out 
these actions” (EC, 2010, p15). However, the coherence between this compulsory new 
element and the current GAEC, Natura 2000 and cross-compliance requirements is unclear. 
How will NATURA 2000 payments and GAEC standards be included in the greening 
component? What is the difference between cross-compliance, the environmental 
requirements in the greening component and agri-environmental measures funded by the 
second pillar? It is also very doubtful whether the “greening” component in the first pillar 
could deliver public goods more efficiently or effectively than more targeted schemes in the 
second pillar (as also argued by Tangermann, 2011).  
 
Given these problems, a logical question arises as to what effect the “greening component” 
would have on the expenditure balance between the two pillars. Current proposals seem to 
have many overlaps. Agri-environmental issues, though not mentioned by name in the main 
text, are to be dealt with under both pillars, contrary to the present system in which agri-
environment is represented in the second axis of the second pillar. If a change in this situation 
is inferred, it is not clear whether this transfer of function is also accompanied by a transfer of 
resources from the second to the first pillar, which would completely contradict the apparent 
logic of the CAP reform path to date. This question concerns payments for areas with specific 
 
5   As reported in AgraEurope (08.03.11): “The Netherlands and Denmark have rallied near unanimous 
support from member states for calls to cut red tape from all elements of the CAP. The paper urges the 
Commission to formulate the entirety of its CAP reform plans with an eye to simplicity, lower 
administrative costs, proportional risk and granting member states administrative freedom where possible. 
The paper, likely to be discussed further at the March 17 Farm Council, already carries the support of 
almost all member states, this week's Special Committee on Agriculture (SCA) meeting revealed.” 
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natural constraints where it is also unclear which elements of these payments, if any, will 
remain in the second pillar. It is also unclear which agri-environmental activities will stay 
within the second pillar and which will be transferred into the first pillar, and in addition, the 
implementation of such a “dual” system is also dubious. On the whole, the “greening” of the 
first pillar and existing second pillar agri-environmental instruments appear to have much in 
common, and a lack of detail means the document falls short of providing clear justification 
for the distinction (Jambor, 2011). 
 
These deficiencies in the present proposals are perhaps understandable, since the 
Commission’s Communication represents an outline of possible future directions, still subject 
to substantial debate and negotiation, rather than a definitive statement of policy principles 
and operational details. Nevertheless, they do illustrate the difficulties of arriving at an agreed 
and sensible way forward, and also strike a receptive chord amongst many stakeholders, who 
are likely to agree with the general principle that farmers and land users should be paid for 
their provision of public goods. However serious questions are raised by this common 
presumption. 
 
The real problem behind: Powerless valuation of ecosystem services 
 
The services of natural ecosystems have always been of great importance to our societies as 
they are essential to human survival and wellbeing. Nowadays, there is a clear trend towards 
the monetization and commodification of ecosystems services (Gómez-Baggethun et al., 
2010), though it is questionable how the importance of these services translates into economic 
value. As economics is more concerned with prices than with values or importance, one might 
think that the price of a good reflects its importance in social sense – but this is not true. As 
Heal (2000) puts it, there is no clear relation between the prices of goods and their associated 
social importance. Diamonds are priced more highly than socially important goods such as 
water. Moreover, prices change significantly with supply-demand conditions and it is 
impossible to define a constant value for ecosystems services, including public goods. If 
supply or demand for public goods changes significantly, price changes will follow. 
Therefore, present prices reflect present market conditions and they tell us nothing about how 
things would be if much less is available, or as they become more socially valuable. 
 
There are various methods in economics for estimating prices (willingness to pay, or provide) 
for services with no market price, including: hedonic prices; replacement costs; travel and 
visit costs; contingent valuation. All methods deal with an extremely complex socio-economic 
environment where changes are due to many internal and external factors which are 
practically impossible to capture or control. Ecosystems are a particular configuration of 
resources that provide various services which are almost impossible to measure. Even if 
measured, assessing the value of changes in service provision at the European level poses 
huge challenges as non-constancy of marginal utilities need to be taken into account (Pascual 
et al., 2010). What is more, forecasting models frequently fail to anticipate important social 
and technological developments that can influence the long-term value of natural ecosystems 
(Gowdy, 2007).     
 
It is apparent that we can only make educated guesses about the value of a landscape or the 
value of biodiversity. As a result, any estimates will be subject to ongoing contest and dispute 
and it is unclear how the Commission proposes to deal with these problems. There is no 85th Annual Conference of the Agricultural Economics Society 
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meaningful common value for public goods throughout Europe. There is no reason to suppose 
that the same public goods policy should apply to Established and New Member States  still 
less for each and every region or farm. Moreover, without knowing the proper indicators and 
measurement methodology, the efficiency of the delivery of environmental public goods can 
hardly be evident. Questions arise as to who will evaluate (and on what basis) whether public 
money spent on the provision of public goods has lead to the achievement of the policy’s aims 
or not. Going further, if we cannot measure the outcome, it is impossible for taxpayers to 
understand exactly what they are paying for.  
 
The efficiency of policies providing public goods also rests on dubious grounds as ecosystem 
services are normally characterised by complex ecological processes and functions. The 
relationship between land use change and the provision of ecosystem services, for instance, is 
often context dependent and hard to demonstrate.  In any case, valuation itself is not necessary  
for conservation - we conserve much that we do not value and do not conserve much that we 
do value (Heal, 2000). It is incentives not valuation that encourage owners to conserve public 
goods. Valuation is the outcome of the socio-economic mechanisms we use to organise 
provision and supply with requirements and demand, not a pre-requisite for these 
mechanisms.  The emphasis on valuing public goods as part of ecosystem services is 
misplaced – it puts the cart before the horse. We need to think more clearly about the design 
and encouragement of institutions that will generate both the incentives and penalties, and the 
the social mechanisms for the participation and engagement of the beneficiaries with the 
providers.  Valuation is the outcome of these processes, not the input.  
 
Setting the incentives – policy recommendations 
 
Public goods have special natural characteristics and their problems cannot be solved by 
compensatory payments.  In particular, there is no reason to suppose that “the correct payment 
to farmers for the delivery of public goods and services will be a key element in a reformed 
CAP” (EC, 2010, p 36). What suggestions have been made for the provision of public goods 
in the future?  
 
1. Outcome based approaches 
 
Current agri-environment schemes are designed to meet environmental objectives through 
prescribing and paying for a set of management practices rather than making payments 
conditional on achieving the environmental outcomes themselves. Moving from a 
prescription-based approach towards outcome-oriented measures might provide a more cost 
effective way of delivering the desired public goods. Outcome based approaches directly 
reward the desired result without imposing prescriptions, thereby giving farmers the 
flexibility to choose the most cost effective way to provide the necessary public goods. Such 
an approach would be in line with a more effective evaluation and monitoring system as well 
as with the need for EU and programme level quantified targets, linked to priorities. However, 
so long as the ecological and socio-economic mechanisms linking actions to outcomes remain 
largely unknown or at least uncertain, the efficacy of outcome-related payments on achieving 
the desired levels and mixes of public goods is also likely to be poor.   
 
2. Focus on local needs 
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A positive change in the provision of public goods takes place if these programs catalyse 
sustainable practices desired by those providing these services. Examples include the increase 
in farm profitability by improving soil and water conditions or the various benefits accrued by 
reforestation (e.g. firewood supply, biodiversity growth, air quality increase, etc.).  
 
3. Integrated and cooperative approaches are needed 
 
Many approaches to encourage the provision of public goods tend to take rather diffuse steps 
towards their delivery when targeting a particular beneficiary. However, greater 
environmental benefits may be accrued if delivery takes place at a broader geographic scale, 
particularly where the territory-specific response is needed. This requires policy measures to 
be integrated but also relies on the cooperation of land managers, and often local 
communities, for enhanced environmental benefits (Cooper et al, 2009). 
 
4. Enhance the use of auctions 
 
In order to increase the cost effectiveness of agri-environment schemes, the auctioning of 
agri-environmental contracts is recommended to a certain extent. Through competitive 
bidding for a limited number of contracts, farmers offer the lowest rational price and this 
reduces public expenditure in relation to the desired outcomes, while increasing the targeting 
of agreements. Therefore, auctions have the potential to either achieve the same level of 
scheme uptake at a lower total cost or to expand uptake within a given budget (Cooper et al, 
2009). 
 
5. Reward outstanding performance 
 
As an incentive to manage successful programmes, a reward for outstanding performance 
should be considered. A so called performance reserve, originally proposed in 1999 by the 
Commission, should be allocated to successful programmes, providing an additional 
percentage of their initial budgetary appropriation, thereby serving as an incentive to others to 
manage successful programmes.  
 
6. Support private programmes 
 
Given the uncertainty of the appropriate mechanisms for linking providers with beneficiaries, 
it makes sense to encourage experiment to explore the possibilities – to mimic the evolution 
of the market mechanism itself. NGOs and not-for-profit organisations already exist to 
express the voluntary demand for non-market goods and services and organise their provision 
and delivery. These organisations can be encouraged with appropriate grant-in-aid payments 
to offset the inevitable, but possibly over-emphasised free-rider problem. Competition 
between such organisations for support from the general public and cooperation from the 
providers would be expected to encourage innovation and adaptation so as to develop 
mechanisms and procedures to overcome and reduce the otherwise prohibitive transactions 
costs which underpin the public goods problems. In addition, R&D and extension support is 
needed to provide the necessary information and understandings on which these resolutions 
depend. At root, it is the information and understandings which are the real and undeniable 
public goods which need and deserve both public funding and public provision, not the quasi 
public goods supposed to be associated with land use. 85th Annual Conference of the Agricultural Economics Society 
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From a consideration of the role of public goods in the future CAP we reach a number of 
conclusions. 
 
1. The diverse range of public goods provided by agriculture have different characteristics as 
well as reflecting different aspects of the needs of the European society. Readying us for the 
future requires that the complexity of the system is recognised by agricultural policy, applying 
differentiated and targeted policies rather than attempt to find a one-size-fits-all approach. 
 
2. It is widely argued that the provision of public goods provides a valid reason for public 
intervention in Europe. However, there is no reason to intervene to secure the provision of all 
public goods in Europe. This would be prohibitively costly and public finance is limited. 
Public intervention is only needed in those cases when public demand is greater than the level 
of provision. Furthermore, arguments in favour public support are not the same as arguments 
for government or bureaucratic provision. 
 
3. Various agricultural policy tools exist to encourage landowners to internalise the benefits 
provided by the natural capital on their property but few of these within the current CAP 
framework have a direct focus on encouraging the provision of public goods in Europe. 
Existing measures seem not to have achieved the improvement in the provision of public 
goods on the scale that is required. 
 
4. Neither the provision of compensatory payments nor a greened first pillar solve any of the 
underlying problems of public goods. Direct payments to farmers may be as likely to worsen 
as to improve multifunctional benefits. The real problem lies in difficulties of evaluating 
ecosystems services.  
 
5. It is incentives and appropriate mechanisms, not valuation, which encourage owners to 
conserve and provide public goods. The emphasis on valuing public goods as part of 
ecosystem services is misplaced as economics should help design institutions that will provide 
incentives and mechanisms for the conservation of such goods. In order to help this process, 
various policy recommendations are given in the paper.  
 
6. In the design of future programs for public goods, we should be also aware that transaction 
costs and trade-offs are of utmost importance and payments for a single service might have 
perverse outcomes to another. Due to very high transaction costs of ecosystem services as 
well as realities of human behaviour, there is no particular reason to believe that a market 
based approach for the provision of public goods will be more efficient or sustainable than 
non-market alternatives. Socio-economic institutions need to be adapted to ecosystems, not 
vice versa.  
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